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Hiroshima: The Personal and Political Factors that Led to President Truman's
Decision

I
The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was one of the major events

in world history. Since then, many people have questioned President Truman's decision
and wondered whether Japan would have surrendered soon anyway. President Truman

did not make his decision in a vacuum, but was influenced by many factors, both
personal and political. Many historians have just looked at the political reasons that
Truman dropped the atomic bomb, while ignoring the very real personal factors that may
have also contributed to his decision. Truman's childhood, his relationship with his
father, his early experiences with failure, his experiences in World War I, his dealings

with the Pendergast political machine, and his feelings of inadequacy and inferiority all
influenced his thinking and motivation. Any study that attempts to answer the question

of why the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima must first examine the man who
made the decision.
The political factors that led to Truman's decision to drop the bomb have been

thoroughly examined. Truman always asserted that the primary reason for dropping the
bomb was to save lives; that an invasion of Japan would. have cost many more lives, both

American and Japanese. This explanation has come up for a lot of debate in recent years.
There is also a lot of evidence that the bomb was dropped, in part, to impress and

intimidate the Soviet Union, which led to the beginnings of the Cold War. Historians

i
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have also suggested lesser factors, such as revenge for Pearl Harbor, racial discrimination

toward the Japanese, and a feeling that the bomb had to be used after so much time and
money was spent developing it in the Manhattan Project.r While the political factors
have been the subject ofcountless studies and controversies, the personal factors

of

Truman's own life have been largely neglected. Obviously, the political factors were
Truman's primary considerations for dropping the bomb, but his personal experiences
influenced how he thought about the situation and the options available to him.
Many books and articles have been written on the subject of political psychology
and many have evaluated President Truman. James Barber argues that apresident's

personality is one of the greatest influences on his decisions, that; "every story

of

Presidential decision making is really two stories: an outer one in which a rational man
calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man feels."2 Barber's take on Truman
is that the President had a definite lack of self-confidence that stemmed from his early

childhood and he tried to make up for it by appearing quick and decisive on important
issues, which would make him appear to be a stronger leader. As he says, Truman often
made quick decisions without considering all of the options available to him because he

I
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wanted to appear to be in control.3 Another important work on political psychology is by

Alexander and Juliette George. Their thesis on Truman is very similar to Barber's:
"Truman...accepted the responsibility of making difficult decisions...for it enabled him
to satisfy himself- and, he hoped, others- that he had the personal qualities needed in the
presidency."4 Several other authors have written important works on political
psychology, which include descriptions of Truman's personality and how they influenced
his decision making.s
President Truman often asserted that his childhood was ideal, growing up on a

farm in Missouri with a loving, extended family. However, Truman's family was not
very stable or successful in his early years and they had to move around a lot while his
father struggled at different jobs. Truman's relationship with his father was strained and
he usually worked with his mother in the kitchen, instead of out on the farm with his

father. Truman was

a good student and enjoyed school,

but often thought of himself as a

"sissy''because he was not good at sports and ran away from fights.6 As Truman
progressed into adulthood he faced many disappointments, including not being able to go

to college because his father lost all of his money on a investing in grain futures. Truman
was later forced to quit his job as a bank clerk in Kansas City when his father needed his
help on the family farm. Truman left the farm for World War I where his experiences

3
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greatly influenced how he felt about war. After he came home he married his fianc6 Bess
Wallace and helped start a haberdashery business, which later failed. Truman was
running out of career options, so he decided to enter politics with the help of the powerful
Pendergast political machine, which would negatively affect his future political career.

Truman was a successful senator, but was derided when chosen as President Roosevelt's

Vice President in 1944becatse most people felt that he was not up to the job of being
President. All of these experiences strengthened Truman's inferiority complex and left

him feeling inadequate for the job of being President.
Truman's feelings of inadequacy helped determine how he acted as President. He
always projected an image of self-confidence and assurance, but that was often a mask

for his feelings of insecurity and lack of confidence. As Vice President, Truman was not
informed of the Manhattan Project or the development of the atomic bomb and he came
into the office completely inexperienced in foreign relations. He also felt enormous
pressure to end the war successfully and to live up to the standard set by President

Franklin Roosevelt, who had enjoyed tremendous popularity. All of these factors left
Truman feeling isolated and unprepared for the job. Under these conditions, he was
greatly susceptible to the influence of his top advisors and cabinet members who had
much more experience. Their influence was never more apparent, or important, than in

Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

II
Harry S. Truman was born on May 8, 1884 in Lamar, Missouri to John and
Martha Truman. His father, John Anderson Truman, was a farmer who was always

5

tryrng to strike it rich, but with very little success. His mother, Martha Ellen Young
Truman, was a well-liked daughter of a prominent western Missouri family who had
married John Truman at the age of twenty-nine, after her family had given up on her ever
getting married. After they were wed they moved right outside of Lamar, Missouri where
John bought and sold mules. Shortly after Harry's birth, however, the small family

moved twice more before finally settling down on the farm of Martha's parents near Blue
Ridge, Missouri.T
Truman always remembered his childhood fondly. He lived on the family farm

until the 1890 when, at the age of six, his immediate family moved to Independence so
that Harry could go to school. Truman loved school and was a good student, though not
exceptional, but felt left out from the other children because of his glasses and the fact
that he was not very good at sports. He also found it very hard to relate to girls of his

own age, which is slightty ironic considering his close relationships with his mother,
sister, and other female relatives. Though Truman thought the other boys his age thought

of him as a "sissy," most of them just considered him serious and intelligent.8
Remembering being called a sissy, Truman later said, 'oThat's hard on a boy...and

it

gives him an inferiority complex, and he has a hard time overcoming it."e Even from an
early age, it appears, Truman suffered from low self-esteem and apparently believed that
others did not like him.

Truman's relationship with his father was somewhat difficult. He was frequently
sick as a child and his mother felt an urge to protect him, so he usually helped her with

7
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the household chores while his younger brother, John Vivian, helped with his father's

tasks. Consequently, Truman did not develop

a close

relationship with his father until

later in life and felt that he was somewhat of a disappointment. However, his father
always appears to have had genuine respect for Harry, which he, in turn, shared.l0 John
Truman was a financial failure, which did affect Harry. The elder Truman was always

tryrng to get rich quick on risky business ventures and usually ended up losing a lot

of

money. During Harry's senior year of high school in1902, his father put all of his assets
into grain futures and managed to lose everything. Because of this, Truman was unable
to go to college. However, he appears to have felt no bittemess toward his father and
even seems to have felt that he had to compensate for his father's

failings. "A half-

century later, when Alfred Steinberg suggested to him that his father had been a failure,
Truman responded snappishly, "My father was not a failure. After all, he was the father

of

a President

of the United States."l1

Truman worked as a bank clerk in Kansas City right after graduating from high
school, before going home to work on the farm for eight years to help his father. After

his father died in

lgtt,he

continued to work the farm and experienced his first big

financial failure when azinc mine he invested in proved to be a bust. Shortly afterward,
Truman invested in an oil and gas exploration partnership, which also turned out to be a
failure.12 By 1914, Truman was deeply in debt and was probably feeling quite
pessimistic about his future. The one bright point in his life at the time was that Bess

" Ibid., 67.
"t2 Alonzo L. Hamby,

"American Democrat,"4'7

Mcculough, Truman,

101.
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Wallace had finally agreed to marry him after her initial rejection.r3 She was the only
woman with whom he ever had a serious romantic relationship.
Truman decided to volunteer to go to World War I almost immediately after the

United States entered itinl9l7. He was thirty-three and could easily have avoided going
to war because of his age and poor eyesight, but apparently felt that it was something he
had to

do. His service in the war was a tuming point in his life. Truman later said, "My

whole political career is based on my war service and war associates."l4 He became a
captain who served with distinction and gained the honor and respect of those under his

command. "Terrible as it had been, it was also "the most terrific experience of my life,"
Truman recounted.ls It was his first experience with leadership and at first he struggled
to be commanding, but by the end of the war he was clearly in charge of his men. He
came home from the war

with an apparent new

sense

of self-confidence and

a restored

optimism. However, he had also seen the terrors of war firsthand, which would haunt
him for the rest of his life and make him reluctant to send anyone else in to fight.r6
After his return to Missouri in 1919, Truman married Bess and started

a

retail

clothing business in Kansas City with his partner, Eddie Jacobson. The business was

initially a success, but went bankrupt after three years when Kansas City hit a major
depression. The businoss was in debt to a total of $35,000 and Truman would be paying

it off for the next fifteen years." At the same time, Truman was busy investing in some
risky real estate deals and eventually wound up losing the family farm in 1922. Trvrnarr

"la Takaki,

Hiroshima, lo2.

Barber, Presidential Character, 258.
" Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman. 1910-1959 (New
Norton & Company, 1983),274.
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was thirty-eight years old, was seriously in debt, had failed at every career he had tried,
and was living with his wife and young daughter at his mother-in-law's house. It is easy

to see why he considered himself a failure and felt that his life was going nowhere. It
was with this sense of desperation that he entered into politics.l8

III
The Pendergast political machine ruled Kansas City politics in the 1920's and

Tom Pendergast was the Big Boss. Tom's brother Mike contacted Truman in the latter
part of 1921 and asked him if he would like to run for eastem judge of Jackson County, a

job that would put him in the courthouse in Independence. "Harry accepted their offer at
once, with no hesitation."le Thus started Truman's political career and his association

with the Pendergast machine, which would last until 1939. This partnership would hurt
Truman's career as he advanced in the political world and would reinforce his own
negative self-image.
Truman won the election in 1922, but lost his seat in a Republican landslide in
1924.20 The Pendergast machine contacted Truman again and he ran for presiding judge

of Jackson County in 1926. He held the position for eight years until 1935. During his
tenure

as

judge, Truman made improving county roads his main priority, at which he was

very successful.2l However, it was also at this time that Truman had his first
confrontation with the Big Boss, Tom Pendergast, over awarding contracts to build the
new roads. Pendergast assumed that Truman would award the contracts to party
18

"
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Mccullough, Truman, 159.
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loyalists, but Truman refused and said he would give the conhacts to the lowest bidders.

At first, Pendergast was furious

and

told Truman to do as he was told. Truman persisted

in his refusal, however, and "Pendergast acquiesced reluctantly, but scomfully told
Truman that his honor didn't amount to a pinch of snuff."22

After that meeting, Pendergast never asked Truman to do anything dishonest
again,but reminded him that he was still in charge.23 Truman came away from this
experience knowing that he was involved in a criminal enterprise, but helpless to do

anything about

it. He knew that if he crossed the Pendergasts he would

be out of politics

forever. Truman tried to console himself with the fact that he was still honest himself,
but the situation had deeply bothered him and apparently left him feeling that he was not

in control of his own life.2a
Another troubling experience for Truman at the time was a dealing he had with
the Eastem judge of Jackson County, Robert Barr, who Truman had handpicked for the

job. Barr had stolen $10,000

and Truman found out about

it.

Truman, however, needed

Barr's support for the bonds for the road measures to pass. Consequently, he let Barr get
away with the theft. "I had to compromise to get the voted road system carried out,"
Truman wrote in his diary.2s He felt horrible about the situation and agonized over
whether he had made the right decision. Truman wrote, "Am I an administrator or not?

Or am I just a crook to compromise in order to get the job done?''u By no*, Truman was
completely disgusted with the Pendergast machine and began looking for a way out. He

" Hattfiy, "American Democrat,"
"2o Mccullough, Truman, 188.

47.

Hamby, "American Democrat," 47.

" Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record:
Row, Publishers, 1980), 44.
'u Ibid.

The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper

&

l0
felt the experience had tarnished him and his self-esteem hit an all time low. Politics had
changed him and he longed for a retum to the ideals of his youth.

IV
Inl932,Truman had hoped to be the Democratic nominee for Governor of Missouri, but
the Pendergast machine overlooked him. In 1933, however, he was picked by Tom
Pendergast to be the director of the Federal Reemployment Service in Missouri, which

meant he traveled to Washington, D.C. on a regular basis. It was at this time that Truman
decided to run for the United States Senate. Truman had the support of Tom Pendergast,
but he had not been his first choice. Pendergast had asked three other candidates to run

first, but was turned down by all three. When someono suggested in a meeting that Harry
Truman should run for the Senate, Pendergast exclaimed, "Do you mean to tell me that
you actually believe that Truman can be elected to the United States Senate?"27
Nevertheless, being all out of options, Pendergast agreed. Truman announced his
candidacy on May 14,1934.
Truman was an energetic and tireless campaigner and he drove throughout the
state speaking to anyone who would listen. The primary was the real contest

in

Democratic-dominated Missouri, and Truman won by 40,000 votes, an overwhelming
victory.28 Truman easily won the general election in the fall. The victory did not boost
Truman's self-confidence. He assumed, along with most everyone else, that the
Pendergast machine had won the election, with him contributing very

little. Thus far in

his life, politics had only strengthened Truman's inferiority complex because he felt that

27

Mccullough, Truman, 204.

"

Daniels, Man of Independence, 172
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he could not

win an election on his own. His dealings with the Pendergast machine also

apparently left him feeling comrpted and he lost his belief in his own self-virtue.

"...politics had predominantly negative effects upon his [Truman's] emotions,
personality, and physical well-be ing)'2e
Truman was a hard-working and diligent senator from the beginning of his term.
He felt that he had to prove he belonged there and he set out to be involved in as much as

possible. On one of his first days in the Senate, Senator J. Hamilton Lewis of Illinois said
to him, "Harry, don't start out with an inferiority complex. For the first six months you'll
wonder how the hell you got here, and after that you'll wonder how the hell the rest of us
got here."3o Despite this advice, Truman definitely had an inferiority complex and felt
that he did not fit in with the other more experienced senators. He also thought that the
other senators looked down on him because of his involvement with the Pendergast

machine. "I was under

a

cloud," he would say later."3' While most of his fellow senators

were generally supportive, there were those who could not get past Truman's association

with the Pendergasts and this hurt his political caxeer. Truman had been caught in

a

Catch-22. Without his connection to the Pendergasts, he could not have become involved
in politics in the first place because he did not come from an important family nor did he
have any money. Now, however, this connection was actually hindering his political
advancement because other politicians associated him

with a comrpt political machine.

Truman apparently felt very bitter about this situation, but also ignored his own

culpability in

2e

it.32

Hamby, "American Democrat," 47

'o Truman, Memoirs, 144.

"32 Ibid.

Jenkins, Truman, 38.

t2

In lg3g,the Federal Bureau of Investigation

a:rested Tom Pendergast for tax

evasion and began investigating charges of voter fraud in Kansas City. Pendergast was

convicted and sentenced to fifteen months in prison. Truman was greatly concerned
during this time that he would be charged with voter fraud, but in the end he was not.33

Finally, the cloud of the Pendergast machine was lifted from him and Truman ran for the
Senate again and won in 1940 in his closest election yet. Truman was relieved to have

won the election on his own and his ego and self-confidence received a much-needed
boost.3a

While the press and his fellow senators appeared to respect Truman by writing
favorable articles on him and appointing him to important committees, President
Roosevelt showed very little interest in him. Roosevelt did not offer Truman any public
support during his second senatorial campaign, which greatly annoyed Truman. In

addition, Senator Truman had failed to receive any meaningful meetings with the
President and he felt that he was being ignored.35

v
In the sunmer of 1943, Truman began to be mentioned by political insiders as a possible
vice-presidential candidate in 1944. However, Roosevelt said nothing about it and
Truman, true to his nature, did not believe he would be considered because he did not
believe he was respected urough to be chosen.36 Senator Truman did not want to become

Vice President. He knew the President was ill and he felt that he was not up to the task

33

lbid.

'o Daniels, Man of Independence, 213
35
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36
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being President. When he heard that Roosevelt was considering asking him he replied,

"Tell him to go to he11."37 Truman loved his job

as senator from Missouri and he feared

the awesome responsibility of being President. Finally, Roosevelt asked Truman to be
his vice presidential candidate at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

Truman felt that he had no choice but to accept because of the ongoing war. "We11,"
said finally,

"if that is the situation, I'11have to say yes, but why the hell didn't

I

he tell me

in the first place?"38
Immediately the press began to ridicule Truman. Raymond P. Brandt, a reporter
for the New York Times, wrote,

"If anything should happen to President Roosevelt...we

shall have as our leader a political hack when we could have had a greatman."3e The
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette said in 1944 that Truman was one of the weakest candidates ever
nominated.oo Truman was just as unsure of himself as everyone else and his feelings

of

inadequacy and inferiority roared up again.al Roosevelt won re-election by a narrow

margin and Truman became Vice President for eighty-two days. During this time, the
President and Vice President had very little contact and Truman learned nothing about
the Manhattan Project, the atomic bomb, or Roosevelt's meetings with British Prime

Minister Winston Churchill or Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Truman even remarked that
he knew nothing about foreign affairs.a2 On

April 12,1945 President Roosevelt died

Harry Truman became President.

37
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"3e Truman, Memoirs, 193.
Raymond P. Brandt, "Roosevelt's Folly," The New York Times,22 Octobet 1944, sec. A.
oo
Steven Gould, "Truman as Vice-President," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette ,23 July 1944, sec. A.
*' Takaki, Hirsohima, 104.
o2
Robert H. Ferrell, Truman: A Life (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1994), 198.

and

t4
The nation moumed Roosevelt and doubted Truman's capacity to lead. In a
meeting with generals Eisenhower and Bradley in Germany in1945, General Patton
remarked, "...people are made Vice President who are never intended...to be
presidents.r:43

1i*.

magazitewrote, "[Truman] is a man of distinct limitations,

especially in experience of high-level politics."44 Truman was well aware of people's

low expectations of him and he felt the same way. Truman said to Senator George Aiken
of Vermont, "I'm not big enough. I'm not big enough for this job."ot Suddenly, all

of

the early failures in his life and people's consistently low expectations of him had caught
up to Truman and he was deeply afraid.a6 The situation got worse when, on April 25,
1945, Secretary of War Henry

L. Stimson first informed President Truman of the

development of the atomic bomb.aT

YI
Germany was the first country to achieve atomic fission in 1938. President
Roosevelt, along with his top advisers, believed that they were continuing their
experiments and that the United States must attempt to catch up. Thus, in 1939, the
Manhattan Project was bom. Roosevelt feared what would happen

if Germany

developed the atomic bomb first, and the original target proposed for the bomb was

Germany. However, when Germany surrendered on May 7,1945, the Manhattan Project
continued and was even intensified. The United States govemment did not expect Japan

a3

McCullough, Truman, 350.
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Norton, 1977),15.
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l5
to develop any atomic weapons, but Roosevelt expected the bomb would end the war
more quickly.as Secretary of War Stimson had first learned of the possibility of an
atomic bomb in the

fallof l94l,when

President Roosevelt appointed him to a committee

to advise the President on issues of nuclear power. Stimson was informed of all major
developments of the Manhattan Project throughout Roosevelt's presidency. President
Roosevelt never issued a direct statement saylng that he would drop the bomb on Japan,

but Secretary Stimson wrote after the war, "At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever
hear

it

suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the

government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war."4e

It was only Truman's twelfth day

as President

when Secretary Stimson informed

him of the development of the atomic bomb. Stimson went to the President alone, so as
not to arouse media curiosity. He handed Truman a memorandum of which the first
sentence read,

"Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most

terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole

city."so Stimson intended to shock the President and he did. The memo explained that
the United States and Great Britain were the only countries to have developed the bomb,

but that other countries would surely develop it in the not too distant future. It ended

with a recorlmendation to the President to form

a committee on the matter.sl

President Truman formed the Interim Committee, which was intended to advise
the President on the use of the atomic bomb. The members of the highly secretive
committee were: Henry Stimson, who was Chairman; George L. Harrison, President

ot

o'
to

Takaki, Hiroshi$a, 19.
Stimson, "Decision to Use Atomic Bomb, 10.

Ibid.,

t'Ibid.

12.

of

t6
the New York

Life Insurance Company who served

as special assistant to Stimson; James

F. Byrnes, as Truman's personal representative; Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the

Navy; William L. Clayon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Dr.
Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institute of Washington and Director of the

Office of Scientific Research and Development; Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Chief of Field Service in the Office

of

Scientific Research and Development; and Dr. James B. Conant, president of Harvard

University and chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. The committee
held four meetings, the last of which was a two-day session held on May 3t't and June

I't,

1945, in which the committee was joined by an advisory panel of four physicists who

had been very involved in the development of the atomic bomb. The physicists were:

Enrico Fermi and Arthur H. Compton of the University of Chicago; Emest O. Lawrence
of the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California at Berkeley; and J. Robert
Oppenheimer, head of the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, where the atomic
bomb was being completed.s2
On June 1,1945 the Interim Committee, along with the group of physicists,
reached a conclusion on which all members agreed. The atomic bomb should be dropped

on Japan as soon as possible with no warning, and the best target would be an important
war plant surrounded by worker's homes to 'omake a profound psychological impression
on as many of the inhabitants as possible." Secretaty Byrnes delivered the

52

"General Leslie Groves Reports on a Successful Test, July 1945," in Robert Griffith, ed., The Decision to
Drgp the Atomic Bomb on Japan. Major Problems in American History Since 1945 (Lexington, MA: D.C.
Heath and Cornpany, 1992),54.
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recorlmendation to President Truman, who agreed with the report: "I regarded the bomb
as a

military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used."53
Another group of scientists, headed by Leo Szilard, urged the President not to use

the bomb, but was ovemrled by the government's own science advisers, the physicists

who had assisted the Interim Committee. Generals George C. Marshall and Leslie R.
Groves, commanding general of the Manhattan Project, were Truman's top military
advisers and they also recommended using the bomb as quickly as possible.sa

vII
James F. Byrnes was one of the most

Committee. He had been

a

influential members of the Interim

powerful member of Congress from South Carolina during

the 1930's, was appointed to direct the Office of War Mobilization by President
Roosevelt in 1941, and was considered for the vice presidency in 1944, but Roosevelt
passed him over because his advisers thought he was too outspoken. Truman had great
respect for his

opinion. Byrnes was the most vocal advocate for surprising the Japanese

with the atomic bomb. He also was totally opposed to accepting anything other than
unconditional surrender from the Japanese. Byrnes thought that if the Japanese were
wamed where the atomic bomb would be dropped, that they might transport American
prisoners of war to the area. He also feared that a demonstration of the bomb would fail
and give more impetus to the Japanese cause.55

However, Byrnes also seems to have been greatly concerned with the expansionist
Soviet Union. Byrnes advised Truman that the bomb "might well put us in a position to
s3

"President Harry S. Truman's Advisers Discuss the Atomic Bomb,
'u Takaki, Hiroshima, 39.
s5

Mccullough, f414p44, 395.

May l945" ibid., 51
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\
dictate our own terms at the end of the war."56 Byrnes had the ear of President Truman,
being one of his most trusted advisers, and he intended to make sure that the atomic
bomb was dropped on Japan.

General Leslie Groves was also an important influence on President Truman. He
headed the Manhattan Project from the verybeginning and had always assumed that the

bomb would be used. Groves did not believe that Truman actually had much of a choice

in deciding to drop the bomb. "...as far

as

I was concerned, his decision was basically

one of noninterference...It would indeed have taken a lot of nerve to say no at that

time."57 Groves also thought that the atomic bomb would give the United States an
important advantage over the Soviet Union in the future.58 At this point, all of Truman's
primary advisers were in favor of dropping the atomic bomb on Japan.
President Truman traveled to the Potsdam Conference on July 15 and remained
there until August

2. During his time

at Potsdam, Truman was able to escape much

of

the politics of Washington, D.C. and make his final decision on the use of the atomic

bomb. Meanwhile, back in New Mexico, the first successful test of the atomic bomb was
conducted on July 16, 1945. General Groves wrote a glowing report of the test which
said, "The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone."se
President Truman was very much uplifted by this news and his confidence level was
greatly increased in his subsequent dealings with Stalin. He apparently felt that he did

su
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not need the participation of the Soviet Union in the war; the war could be won with the
atomic bomb.6o
On July 25, L945, President Truman officially approved the use of the atomic

bomb on Japan sometime during the first ten days of August.6l Hiroshima, Kokura, or
Nigata were the three eities that would be targeted, in that order. President Truman
ordered the bomb to be dropped unless Japan surrendered unconditionally before that

time. On JuJy26, the United

States, Great Britain, and China issued the Potsdam

Declaration calling for Japan's unconditional surrender or "the inevitable and complete
destruction of the Japanese armed forces" would ensue. No mention of the atomic bomb
was made. On July 28, Japan appeared to reject the peace offer and, on August
at 8:11

6,1945,

AM, the Enola Gay dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.62

VII
Why did Truman decide to use the bomb? The most widely accepted answer was
given by Truman himself, who said, "General Marshall told me that it might cost half a

million American lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home grounds."63 President
Truman always maintained that he dropped the bomb to save as many lives as possible.
He apparently believed that that was why he ordered the use of the bomb, but his decision
must be looked at in the context of the rest of his presidency and even in the rest of his

life. Truman assumed the office after the death of an extremely popular President and he
was thrown into the presidency without any real preparation or knowledge of foreign
uo
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affairs. Most of the country, including Truman himself had exceedingly low
expectations of him. Truman's decision to drop the bomb, therefore, was also influenced

by an inferiority complex he had suffered from from the earliest stages of his childhood,
which was reinforced by his personal and political experiences.

Hany Truman had always faced low expectations of himself, had suffered though
many disappointments and failures during his lifetime, and often felt that he was not
masculine enough. Once he even wrote to his future wife Bess, "Mamma says I was
intended for a girl anyway. It makes me pretty mad to be told so but I guess it's partly
so."64 Truman suffered through the teasing of his classmates and felt that he was a
disappointment to his father because he was not enough of a man. Truman finally got a
chance to prove his masculinity when he led a cavalry unit in World War

I and his men

remembered his bravery. However, Truman still felt like he had not accomplished
anything in life, especially after his numerous investments left him heavily in debt and
his haberdashery business failed.6s
Truman entered into politics only because he had failed at everything else and his

involvement with the Pendergast political machine only reinforced his inferiority

complex. Truman initially felt that he could not succeed in politics by himself but his
narrow re-election to a second term in the Senate without the Pendergast machine helped

him overcome that fear. However, whenever Truman conquered a major hurdle in his
life, some new obstacle always seemed to present itself. After his reelection to the
Senate, Truman was the most confident he had even been in his life, even sometimes

appearing arrogant. "lnstead of his original humble attitude," wrote...Raymond P.
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Brandt in the New York Times in 1940, "he is almost arrogant at times..."66 However, as
soon as word began to spread that Truman might be Vice President, and when he was

subsequently nominated, he began to fall againinto self-doubt. It did not help his already

low self-esteem that he was widely portrayed in the press

as inadequate

for the

presidency. Right when Truman was beginning to feel comfortable as Vice President,
President Roosevelt died and Truman had to take over the most powerful office in the

world.

Just when Truman was becoming accustomed to the presidency, he was informed

of the existence of the atomic bomb and was faced with one of the most difficult
decisions in history. Already suffering from self-doubt and feelings of inadequacy, he
was expected to make a decision that would alter the course of history, in a very short
amount of time. It is almost arnazingthat Truman handled the situation as well as he did.
The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was probably not made as
President Truman described it in his Memoirs: "The final decision of where and when to
use the atomic bomb was up to

me. Let there be no mistake about it."67 It is true that

President Truman had the final say and could, theoretically, have chosen not to use the
bomb, but in reality, Truman let his top advisers make the decision for him. Truman was
not prepared at the critical time to make a fully informed, independent decision. He did
not have enough knowledge of, or experience in, foreign affairs, nor did he possess the
self-confidence to go against the advice of his top military, political, and scientific

advisers. Truman probably would have dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima even
he had been a more experienced president, but he might have given the situation a

66
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more thought. As it was, he wholeheartedly followed the advice of his top advisors

without thinking about the matter independently and objectively.
James F. Byrnes, Henry

L. Stimson, and General Leslie Groves were all very

influential in the decision to use the atomic bomb. Truman relied greatly on their advice
because of their long years of experience. Byrnes held particular sway over the

President. Byrnes served as Truman's personal representative on the Interim Committee
and he was the one who informed Truman of all of their decisions and recommendations.

Bymes was also the most hard-line member of the Committee and the most ardent
proponent of using the bomb without any waming. Bymes had a strong personality and

probably had a fairly easy time in persuading the President to go in the direction he

wanted. If Truman had possessed more self-confidence, he could have taken Byrnes'
advice with a grain of salt. Stimson was also influential as Secretary of War and one

of

Truman's most trusted advisers because of his long years of experience in foreign affairs,

while Truman also considered Groves an expert because he was head of the Manhattan
Project. These three advisers were the primary decision makers in Truman's early days
as President and

probably had a greater role in the decision to drop the atomic bomb on

Hiroshima than the President himself.
Harry Truman's experiences in life did not leave him with enough self-confidence
to be the tough, decisive President he appeared to be. He was very successful at hiding

his insecurities, but they were still there nonetheless. There were many positive
experiences in Truman's life, but they could not outweigh the heavy burden of the

negative ones. Because of these experiences, the President was left with an inferiority

complex that did not allow him to believe that he was up to the task at hand, whether
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being an adequate husband for Bess Wallace or being a successful President of the United
States. Truman desperately wanted, however, to be seen as confident and capable, and
when he became President he wanted the whole world to see that he was a strong leader
and that he would not let anyone push him around anymore. Early in his political career,
he had allowed the Pendergasts to do so. He wanted to show his childhood classmates,

his father, his wife, his political acquaintances, the press, and, most importantly, himself
that he was more than capable of being just a President. However, he still did not possess
enough self-confidence to make the decision to drop the atomic bomb, so he let his
advisers make

it for him, while telling the world that the decision was his alone. Finally,

Truman felt that he had made a major contribution to the world and that he was not a
failure anyrnore. In reality, however, he had let others make the most difficult decision
his life for him and he was still consumed with his own insecurities. For the rest of his

life Truman would refuse to question his decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan,
probably in part because he was not sure if he had been capable of making another
decision.
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